Comments on Sklar's ``Barbour's Relationist Metric of Time'' by Pooley, Oliver
Comments on Sklar’s
“Barbour’s Relationist Metric of Time”∗
Oliver Pooley
Oriel College, University of Oxford
12 July, 2004
Professor Sklar’s paper (Sklar, 2003–4) illustrates very well the vitality of the relationalist–
substantivalist debate, a debate that not so long ago was declared by some to be outmoded
(Rynasiewicz, 1996). To a limited extent, in fact, the critics are right, for it is not the relational-
ist–substantivalist debate per se that is providing a rich vein of philosophical material. Rather
interest is now (or should be) in a family of interpretative questions concerning space and time
in physics that are related to, though not identical to, those of the traditional debate. The work
of Julian Barbour has played a central role in posing many of these questions and suggesting
answers. In the context of Newtonian physics—the context of Sklar’s paper—it is true that
Barbour offers a picture that is relationalist in the traditional sense: the rock-bottom ontology
consists only of material particles; there is nothing more to space and time than the relative
distances between these particles, and their relational evolution. But things are different when
Barbour extends his Machian framework to general relativity and beyond. In these contexts
space (though not spacetime) re-enters at a fundamental level. In the context of relativity,
one of the most unorthodox features of Barbour’s picture is his rejection of spacetime’s fusing
of space and time, and his embracing an ontology of global “Nows”. This feature of his
worldview should be of particular interest to philosophers who wish to defend an A-theory of
time, although it should be stressed that Barbour himself has no time for a privileged present,
or for the objective passage of time.
In these comments I will focus on two questions raised by Sklar. First, does Barbour and
Bertotti’s approach to Newtonian dynamics constitute a genuine alternative to the standard
way of conceiving of the theory? Second, and this is really Sklar’s principal question, if one
supposes that it does constitute a genuine alternative, how is one to choose which viewpoint to
adopt? Which methodological considerations bear on, and are raised by, the existence of such
a choice?
In raising the first of these questions, and answering it positively, Sklar gives an exemplary
non-technical review of many of the key aspects of the Barbour–Bertotti framework. I too wish
to rehearse some of the details. Doing so will also allow me to highlight some of its features that
are pertinent to my later discussion, but I also want to present Barbour’s viewpoint in a way
which points in the direction of two things Sklar mentions in passing. One is that the ultimate
test for Barbour’s approach is how successfully it generalizes, beyond Newtonian dynamics, to
our contemporary physics. The second is the question of eliminating the ‘absolute’ structure
that remains, namely, the absolute spatial metric of instantaneous configurations.
So let me now give my own gloss on the Barbour–Bertotti approach to Newtonian dynam-
ics. Suppose the actual world to be a world of N point-particles interacting in such a way that,
relative to some coordinate systems on space and time, the actual trajectories satisfy Newton’s
laws of gravitation. Suppose I give you the relative distances between the particles at
∗This is a corrected version of a paper that was originally printed in Chronos: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time
Society 6 (2003–4): 77–86. It expands upon my commentary on Lawrence Sklar’s paper at the Philosophy of
Time Society meeting at APA Central, Chicago, April 2004. Although a commentary, the current paper should
be comprehensible without reference to Sklar’s paper.
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some instant, and the relative rates of change of these.1 Is this information all you need in order
to be able to work out the entire sequence of sets of relative distances that constitute a history?
If the only constraint is that in some spacetime coordinate system Newton’s laws are true, the
answer is No.2
There is a particularly elegant perspective from which to view this fact. One thinks of
formulating possible dynamics on a series of abstract spaces. First, one considers the space
QT—a space formed from two separate spaces: T , the space of Newton’s absolute times, and
Q the space of the possible configurations of our N particles given by their positions in some
autonomous, persisting space (e.g., the relative space of an inertial frame). This is the arena
for the Lagrangian formulation of Newtonian dynamics, which picks out a privileged class of
curves in this space as representing dynamically possible histories. A crucial point to note is
that if one is given a point in QT (i.e., a configuration with respect to space, at a time) and
a direction at that point (i.e., one is also told how, with respect to space, that configuration is
changing, and how quickly), one can calculate a unique Newtonian history.
But one might wonder about formulating dynamics on Q alone. What happens if one
‘projects down’ the possible Newtonian curves in QT , onto Q ? Is a point and a direction in Q
enough to single out a unique curve in Q ? The answer is No. A point and a direction in Q
only gives us a configuration and how it is changing relative to absolute space. It does not tell
us how quickly it is changing (i.e., it does not give the total kinetic energy), and this can make a
dramatic difference to the subsequent evolution.
However, the projections of curves from QT down to Q can all be obtained by a family of
dynamical principles formulated on Q alone, where, for each point in Q and direction at that
point, each such principle does predict a unique curve. These are the Jacobi principle formula-
tions of the dynamics. Each principle corresponds to a system of a fixed total energy. They are
geodesic principles on Q , and time does not in any way appear in their formulation: we have a
metric defined on Q , and curves representing physically possible histories are simply extremals
of this metric. It turns out, however, that the form of the principles is such that there is a pre-
ferred parametrization of the curves, which simplifies the equations satisfied by the curve, and
which corresponds to Newton’s absolute time. Hence the talk of recovering Newton’s time as
a unique simplifying parameter, a procedure Barbour connects with astronomers’ empirical
determination of ephemeris time.
At this stage it is important to note a distinction between two ways in which time might
be said to be a ‘simplifying parameter’. Making this distinction is crucial if one is to recog-
nize the full significance of Barbour’s adaptation of the Jacobi principle to provide a genuine
elimination time (or at least of a primitive temporal metric).
Consider Newtonian dynamics formulated in generally covariant spacetime terms as in,
for example, Friedman (1983). Here the equations are ugly, and one of the basic entities they
govern is a field that does nothing other than encode a primitive temporal metric. But we can
effect an apparent simplification by adapting our spacetime coordinates to this (and other)
1By giving you only the relative rates of change, I am not giving you information about how quickly the
relative distances are changing with respect to time itself, but only information such as: when the distance r12
between particles 1 and 2 has doubled, r23 has reduced by a third.
2Whether this in itself really does count as prima facie evidence against relationalism leads to the question—
perhaps more intricate than is commonly supposed—of the rationale for what Barbour calls Poincaré’s criterion, (see
Pooley and Brown, 2002, §4). I leave this issue to one side.
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spacetime structures: the time coordinate of these special coordinates then straightforwardly
encodes the ontologically fundamental temporal intervals.
There are points of comparison between the generally covariant spacetime formulation
of a Newtonian theory and so called parameterized particle dynamics. We can consider arbitrary
parameterizations of possible curves in QT , if we treat time as another dynamical (i.e. depen-
dent) variable. So formulated the principle is parametrization invariant, leading to a constrained
Hamiltonian theory when cast in Hamiltonian form. One might then view the standard for-
mulation of analytical mechanics as involving a choice of a simplifying parameter that encodes
the ‘dynamical’ time variable.
Note that time is not eliminated in either the case of generally covariant spacetime theo-
ries, or in the case of parameterized particles dynamics. In the generally covariant spacetime
theories, time appears as an autonomous spacetime field. In parameterized theories, time sits
among the alleged configuration variables, as it does in their Hamiltonian versions. In these
cases identifying time with a preferred, simplifying coordinate, amounts to nothing more than
choosing coordinates adapted to these particular structures.
Something very different is going on in the Jacobi principle, which can be obtained from
the parameterized form of the standard dynamics by the elimination of the time variable.3 The
result is an action that remains parametrization invariant but time itself does not sit amongst
the configuration variables: these are just spatial positions. Barbour’s simplifying parameter
simplifies the collective dynamics of these entities. It does indeed turn out that each particle
then obeys an equation that looks like the Newtonian equation, but the interpretation of the
equation that the perspective suggests is radically different.
Having considering Barbour’s use of Jacobi’s approach to ‘eliminate’ time, let us turn to
his elimination of absolute space. Consider a third abstract space: QRCS, the space of relative
configurations (each point just encodes the relative distances between our N point particles,
not their positions in some container space). We can project down our preferred curves in Q
to curves in QRCS and ask, again, whether a point and a direction in QRCS is sufficient to pick
out one of the class of curves so obtained. The answer is again No, but now a contrast with
the transition from QT to Q needs to be noted. Unlike the curves in Q , we cannot obtain the
entire set of curves in QRCS from a family of dynamical principles formulated on QRCS alone.
It is only those curves which correspond to a Newtonian system with zero angular momentum
that can be obtained from such a principle.
I wish to make four points in terms of this more abstract framework, before finally turn-
ing to the methodological issues that are raised by the choice between standard Newtonian
theories and their Barbour–Bertotti analogues.
My first point concerns the way in which Barbour’s elimination of the primitive temporal
metric on the one hand, and his elimination of primitive inertial structure on the other, are
quite independent of each other. This is reflected in the two-stage nature of the passage from
QT to QRCS. We could equally well have passed first to QRCST and then to QRCS. The
eliminations, in addition to being independent, are also of quite different characters. And this
difference, as we will see, has interpretative implications. The passing from QT to Q involved
no real restriction:
3Hence Sklar’s gloss that Jacobi’s approach involves treating time “as if it were an extra dynamical variable”
(2003–4, 66), while it describes a stage on the way to Jacobi’s principle, is misleading if taken to apply to the final
result.
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for any solution in QT to the original theory, one can find a Jacobi principle that has its unique
projection in Q as a solution. Correspondingly, whatever the value of the total energy E of
the universe (the system to which the relational dynamics applies), one can find a timeless
Jacobi-type principle to describe it.4
My second point concerns the key question (considered by Sklar (2003–4, 68; 72)) of
whether Barbour–Bertotti theory represents a genuine alternative to Newtonian dynamics.
Here the distinction between the elimination of time, and the elimination of inertial structure,
means that we should consider these elements of the theory separately. Despite the remark
just made under point 1, it does seem that Jacobi’s principle can be given a properly timeless
interpretation. As mentioned above, there is difference between cases where time has been
genuinely eliminated, and where time has simply been included as a pseudo-configuration
variable. Both types of theory give rise to constrained Hamiltonian systems, but the constraints
are mathematically different in each case, and Barbour’s perspective suggests a very different
interpretation of them. (This point would appear to be of obvious relevance to the interpre-
tation of the constraints of canonical general relativity, where the Hamiltonian constraint is
analogous to the Jacobi principle constraint, not to a constraint that arises from parametriza-
tion, a point lucidly argued for by Barbour himself (Barbour, 1994). I find it slightly surprising
that the philosophical literature on the related problem of time in quantum gravity does not
contain more discussion of this insight.)
Turning to the elimination of inertial structure, in the presentation above we passed from
the Newtonian configuration space Q to the relational QRCS. Barbour and Bertotti’s dynami-
cal principle on QRCS might similarly be defined by starting with the standard (Jacobi) action
principle on Q .5 In particular, the geometric structure on QRCS, in terms of which the dy-
namical principle is framed, might be understood as induced by the geometric structure of Q .
In such circumstances, and with the geometric structure of Q naturally receiving a substan-
tivalist interpretation, the claim that one is being presented with an alternative theory might
seem hard to defend. Fortunately Barbour has an account of the QRCS theory, in terms of a
variational process that he calls “best matching”, which makes it transparently clear that the
theory is committed to nothing more than the relational quantities. Effectively the notion of
best matching provides an alternative, relationalist (re)interpretation of the relevant structures
of the larger space Q .6 Sklar writes:
4It is true that, in the context of the original Barbour–Bertotti theory Barbour recommends the action that
one obtains when E = 0 on the grounds of its simplicity and mathematical elegance, but observations within
such a Newtonian universe could in principle rule out E = 0 as a possible value. It is not the case that the choice
E = 0 is conventional, or a calculational convenience, although, for finite values of E, the absolute value will be
conventional to the extent that they are dependent on the choices of units for length, mass etc.; cf. Sklar (2003–4,
68). Things are different when it comes to Barbour’s recent scale-invariant generalizations of Barbour–Bertotti
theory: see point 4, below.
5Belot’s presentation (Belot, 1999, 2000) of a Hamiltonian theory closely connected to Barbour and Bertotti’s,
although without the elimination of a primitive temporal metric, follows this type of route.
6The need for a genuinely relationalist interpretation of the QRCS theory is considered at greater length in
Pooley and Brown (2002, §§5 & 7). For Barbour’s most recent, accessible account of the best-matching variational
process, see Barbour (2003, §4).
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It is sometimes argued by defenders of Barbour and Bertotti that their demonstra-
tion that the theory can be derived from a new action principle framed entirely in
relationist terms adds to the believability of the theory. (2003–4, 72)
I would prefer to put the point this way. The fact that the solutions of Barbour–Bertotti
theory can be obtained from a theory of a type which can be shown to be motivated by, and
understandable in terms of, relationalist first principles is a prerequisite for being able to take
the theory seriously as a genuine alternative to standard (substantivalist) Newtonian dynamics.
However, that such a demonstration is possible does not by itself favour the relationalist theory
over the standard one; it just means that we do face a genuine choice between the two.
My third point concerns the generalization of Barbour–Bertotti theory to general relativ-
ity. Our discussion in terms of configuration spaces facilitates this story. Corresponding to the
point-particle configuration spaces Q and QRCS, there arise in the investigation of canonical
general relativity two, much larger, configuration spaces: Riem(M), the space of all Rieman-
nian metrics on some 3-dimensional manifold M of fixed topology, and Riem(M)/Diff(M)—
or ‘superspace’—, the space one gets fromRiem(M) by quotienting by the group of diffeomor-
phisms on M . A geodesic principle on Riem(M)/Diff(M) would appear to be the analogue
of the timeless, relational theory on QRCS. It turns out that general relativity itself can be cast,
without real modification, as just such a theory. To transform the standard action of general
relativity into such a form, one does not have to impose an analogue of the constraint that the
angular momentum of the point-particle universe is zero; general relativity already implements
best matching.7 To put the point the other way around: general relativity is not the analogue of
a full Newtonian Jacobi theory on Q . Any such theory on Riem(M) would be an (odd) gener-
alization of general relativity.8 All of this concerns inertial structure. What of the elimination
of time? Different values of the total energy E in distinct Newtonian Jacobi principles turn out
to be the analogues of different values of the cosmological constant. So here again, it turns
out that the standard formulation of general relativity (i.e., those for which the cosmological
constant is regarded as a fundamental constant) can already be interpreted as doing away with
a primitive temporal metric when cast in the appropriate form.
My final point concerns the ‘absolute’ structure that remains in the Barbour–Bertotti the-
ory: the instantaneous inter-particle distances. It is worth pointing out that such distances
hardly contravene the spirit of traditional relationalism. However, perhaps they can be threat-
ened by a version of the Leibnizian shift arguments that (erroneously in my view) might be
taken provide the philosophical motivation for a relationalist alternative to standard physics.
For consider the universe doubling in size overnight while preserving all of the ratios of the
relative distances. How would such a change be detectable? Does regarding such differences
as
7It is worth stressing that such a formulation of general relativity nonetheless constitutes a more restricted
theory than the standard 4-dimensional spacetime formulation. Clearly it will have only globally hyperbolic
spacetimes as solutions. Further, in the choice of M , we have fixed the spatial topology.
8Some of these points a further explored in Pooley (2001), where it is also argued that the theory is not
relationalist because the points of Riem(M)/Diff(M) are naturally interpreted as intrinsic specifications of the
geometry of empty, substantival space.
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meaningful saddle us with distinct possible worlds, differing from each other only by an overall
scale factor, that violate the principles of sufficient reason and the identity of indiscernibles?9
The answer is No: empirically we can determine whether a given distance has increased
or decreased from one moment of time to the next. However, this determination is mediated
by theory, just as our ability to determine whether a body is absolutely accelerating is. And
Barbour has considered a generalization of the original Barbour–Bertotti theory to a scale-
invariant theory that does away with primitive comparisons of distance at different times (see
Barbour, 2003). One considers the space Q0 which encodes only the ratios of the relative dis-
tances between particles. By generalizing the notion of best matching, geodesic principles on
this space can be found which correspond to dynamical theories for which, while comparisons
of distances in different places at a time are primitively meaningful, comparisons of distances
at different times are not. However, just as the original best matching of the Barbour–Bertotti
theory allows the construction of emergent inertial frames (as its reproducing a subset of the
solutions of a Newtonian theory entails it must), so the generalized best matching of scale-
invariant theories allows for a dynamically determined comparison of distances at different
times.
Let us ask the analogous question to those asked above. Take some Newtonian-type
Barbour–Bertotti theory defined on QRCS and project its solutions down onto Q0. If the pro-
jected curves are to be found as the solutions of some geodesic principle on Q0, are there
constraints placed on the original theory, and on its solutions? The answer, as might have
been expected, is Yes. Of particular interest to us here is the fact that the total energy of the
system must be zero, and the potentials of all the forces must be homogeneous of degree −2.
This appears to be in conflict with those Newtonian-type theories that have enjoyed empirical
success, none of which involve force potentials that are homogeneous of degree −2.10 How-
ever, Barbour shows how any such theory, including those with non-zero values of total energy,
can be obtained as an approximation from the right choice of scale-invariant theory, which will
reproduce the original Newtonian potentials together with an epoch-dependent cosmological
force.
It turns out that the scale-invariant, or conformal generalization of best matching is of
particular interest in the context of general relativistic theories (Anderson et al., 2003). The
general relativistic analogue has the potential to reintroduce a preferred foliation of spacetime
at a fundamental level, a foliation that has already long been recognized to be mathemati-
cally significant because it makes the initial value problem of general relativity significantly
more tractable. The framework also suggests generalizations to theories which would differ
empirically
9Actually, these two cases should distinguished. One might believe that primitive trans-temporal comparisons
of distance are physically meaningful, and hence sanction the use of QRCS, but deny that trans-world comparisons
are meaningful, and hence deny that two worlds could differ only by an overall scale factor. For this reason
it would seem to be a mistake to take the use of QRCS, which is required if one is committed to the primitive
comparability trans-temporal distances, to indicate a commitment to the corresponding trans-world differences
(similar points, in a different are context, are made in Pooley, forthcoming). In the theories discussed below
the trans-temporal comparison of distance is given up, but primitive trans-temporal comparison of angle remains
meaningful. It seems that any theory formulated in terms of a geodesic principle on a configuration space will be
committed to the primitive comparability of some trans-temporal quantities.
10In contrast, the constraint imposed on the form of the potentials by Barbour and Bertotti’s original best
matching—that the potentials be functions just of the relative distances—was not in conflict with empirical evi-
dence.
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from general relativity in crucial respects. I suggest that all of this has an important bearing
on Sklar’s question concerning the choice between the original Barbour–Bertotti theory and
the standard Newtonian theory. For it points to a way in which a choice between them can
transcend the interpretation of the particular solutions that they have in common. Surely
theory choice is partly determined by the more general framework in which the theories are
embedded, and by which avenues of fruitful research they suggest. While empirically indis-
tinguishable with respect to certain solutions, neither Barbour–Bertotti theory nor standard
Newtonian theory is ultimately empirical adequate. The fact that they generalize in very dif-
ferent directions leaves open the possibility that it may be future theoretical developments that
ultimate reveal which is ‘closer to the truth.’
I now turn to some of the specific methodological questions raised by the question of which
of Barbour–Bertotti or standard Newtonian dynamics would be preferable if our universe
really were a Newtonian universe of zero angular momentum. Three subissues raised by Sklar
strike me as particularly interesting: (1) Whether Barbour’s theory is to be preferred because
it does not suffer from deficiencies suffered by the standard Newtonian theory. Sklar answers
that the standard theory can have the deficiencies removed and so this leads to one of the issues
that flows from the cosmological nature of Barbour’s theory: (2) if neither theory is inherently
objectionable (the Newtonian deficiencies can be overcome), how do we choose between them
given that it cannot be based on empirical evidence? (3) Finally, there is the issue of the relation of
‘isolated’ subsystems of the universe to the universe as a whole: what does the theory say is the
‘influence’ of the latter on the former? I will say a little about each of these in turn.
According to Sklar, the traditional substantivalist understanding of Newtonian theory suf-
fers from defects in that it commits us to physically meaningful quantities that are in principle
empirically beyond reach. The shift from Newtonian space to Galilean spacetime gets rid of
some of these (absolute velocities), but some remain; in particular, temporal shifts, and spatial
shifts of the entire material universe with respect to space and time are supposed to give us
distinct universes which are nonetheless empirically indistinguishable. Sklar proposes that we
consider a ‘sanitized’ Newtonian theory that deals with the temporal shifts in Barbour’s way
(i.e., via the Jacobi method), and then deals with the latter by introducing quantities of absolute
acceleration as primitive monadic predicates. (These properties, originally countenanced in
Sklar (1974) are dubbed ‘sklarations’ by Huggett, who develops the idea in Huggett (1999).)
I am against this approach on two counts. First, it seems that one might wish to consider a
similar question about a choice between a Newtonian theory (sanitized so as to avoid temporal
shift problems, but still involving a primitive notion of temporal distance between instants) that
allows the universe to have any possible energy, with a Barbour-style but non-relational theory
that only allows the universe to have one energy, does not involve a primitive temporal metric,
but does involve primitive inertial structure.
Second, I do not think that the standard substantivalist account does suffer from the alleged
defects. The difference between universes involving the entire material universe shifted with
respect to spacetime (whether spatially or temporally) are of a different kind to those differences
between two old-style Newtonian universes which differ in terms of the absolute velocity of the
material universe with respect to absolute space. Both types of difference are unobservable, but
the former, and not the latter, are merely haecceitistic differences: differences only over which
entities in the worlds instantiate which properties, not differences over which properties are
instantiated. I believe it is coherent just to deny that there can be such differences. And that
the denial of such differences is perfectly compatible with the standard formulations of
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the theory.11 If such differences are allowed then they arise in any theory. By eliminating
spacetime points, models of Barbour–Bertotti theory cannot differ in terms of which points
instantiate which properties, but they can differ in terms of which particles have which proper-
ties: the properties of two particles can be swapped to yield two distinct, possible but qualitative
identical worlds.12 I also believe that the postulation of primitive monadic accelerations brings
with it some particularly undesirable consequences, as we will shortly see.
So if we sanitize Newtonian theory the sophisticated substantivalist’s way, which should we
choose: Barbour–Bertotti theory or the standard theory? As Sklar stresses, we cannot do what
is standardly done: look for cases where their empirical predictions differ. Their predictions do
differ, but only, ex hypothesi, in other possible worlds.
The most obvious difference between the theories is that according to standard Newto-
nian dynamics the vanishing of the universe’s angular momentum is a contingent fact, but
according to Barbour–Bertotti theory, it is a lawlike prediction. Should this count in favour
of the Barbour–Bertotti theory (cf. Sklar, 2003–4, 71; 73–4)? Here Sklar makes two interest-
ing comparisons. The first is with the role that a low-entropy initial condition plays in the
reconciliation of time-symmetric statistical mechanics with time-asymmetric thermodynam-
ics. Do such initial conditions, that are in some sense extremely improbable, stand in need of
an explanation, as many have felt they do? And if the answer is Yes, does this reflect badly
on standard Newtonian mechanics? Here it is worth mentioning that it is perhaps not clear
that zero angular momentum is unlikely from the perspective of Newtonian mechanics. Frank
Arntzenius has suggested that standard Newtonian mechanics predicts that there will be no
observable universal rotation because as N → ∞, the measure of the set of random distribu-
tions of N particles with discernible angular momentum goes to zero. But if we suppose that
Barbour–Bertotti theory does explain, while Newtonian theory does not explain, the zero an-
gular momentum of the universe, then we need not address whether in general such conditions
stand in need of explanation. All we need ask is, when we do have a choice between a theory
that does (genuinely) explain and one that does not, which is preferable?
Sklar’s second comparison involves the inflationary explanation of the ‘improbable’ cosmo-
logical spatial near-flatness of our universe. Might the Newtonian not be able to postulate some
mechanism that analogously results in near zero angular momentum? Perhaps. But any such
mechanism would surely break the empirical equivalence between Barbour–Bertotti theory
and the Newtonian theory. For example, it might be expected to leave a distinctive signature,
much as different inflationary models predict different fluctuations of the cosmic microwave
background.
I have the strong intuition that Barbour–Bertotti theory does offer a potential explanation
of a universe’s zero angular-momentum.13 Why? Here, I think, the contrast with the universal
energy is illuminating. Although each Jacobi principle restricts the energy of the universe to
be whatever it is—the value of the universal energy is to be interpreted as a fundamental
constant—there is a sense in which the value is nevertheless in no sense explained. The reason
is that for
11This obviously needs to be defended at much greater length than I can here. I take it that many substantivalist
responses to Earman and Norton’s hole argument effective endorse such a ‘sophisticated’ substantivalism. I
defend the approach in Pooley (forthcoming, §4–5) and, more thoroughly, in Pooley (in preparationb).
12To avoid worries concerning such permutations violating essentialist constraints, consider a permutation of
particles which share all of their intrinsic properties such as mass and charge.
13This intuition is defended in Pooley and Brown (2002).
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any value of energy you like, there is an equally good, distinct, theory of exactly the same type
that allows just this value. Although it is a fundamental constant, it is an arbitrary parameter
of the theory.14 This is not the case with zero value of angular momentum. Only if the value
is zero can the relationalist theory even get off the ground. The moral, rather interestingly,
appears to be that lawlike predictability, or nomological necessity, by itself cannot be taken to
explain. In this particular case, the constraint arises through an interplay between fundamen-
tal ontological categories (relationalism) and the requirement that the theory be of a certain
type (that initial data consist only in configuration variables and their first derivatives). How,
if at all, should this be understood to have extra explanatory power? At the very least the
contrast suggests that some interesting avenues might be profitably explored.
Finally, I want to conclude with some remarks about the light the various theories shed
on the relation of subsystems of the universe (and the theories they are held to obey) to and
the universe as a whole (and the cosmological theory). There is a basic ‘conspiracy’ for an
account of which wemust ultimately look to our cosmological theory. Any two isolated systems,
each obeying Newton’s laws, are systematically related, despite their isolation. The preferred
time parameters defined by their motions and Newton’s laws march in step, and the two
spatial reference frames defined by their motions and Newton’s laws are in uniform translatory
motion with respect to each other. Why? The basic, mathematical, fact is that if a total system
obeys Newton’s laws with respect to a particular spatial reference frame and time parameter,
then isolated subsystems of this system will obey Newton’s laws with respect to the same frame
and time. However, the different cosmological theories give very different spins to this fact.
Barbour–Bertotti gives a non-local, holistic explanation. It is the dynamics of the universe
as a whole that determines both the universal reference frame and the universal time. Con-
sider two isolated systems A and B, separated by a vast distance. From the Barbour-Bertotti
perspective, the motions of system A contribute to determining the universal frame and hence
help determine those frames with respect to which system B will be seen to obey Newton’s
laws.
In contrast, the local spacetime theory approach gives a local ‘explanation’ of this coor-
dination. The universal frames are those coordinate systems adapted to the primitive spatio-
temporal structures. Their flatness accounts for the existence of such global coordinate sys-
tems, with respect to which Newton’s laws take their standard, non-generally-covariant form.
But now the fact that each system obeys Newton’s laws separately is accounted for by the local
laws constraining these material systems to be adapted in the right way to the structure fields
in their locality.
What of Sklar’s sanitized Newtonian theory, with its primitive monadic accelerations? It
seems that in this case we add to the mystery, rather than explain it. For the coordination
between the inertial frames of the two isolated systems now becomes a coordination between
the sklarations instantiated by the components of the systems, a coordination that might seem
to stand in need of explanation, and in tension with their status as primitive properties. Of
course, the various laws that determine the coordination of the sklarations of isolated systems
receive a transparent explanation if they are taken to be what they are: accelerations with re-
spect to a preferred class of coordinate systems, however these coordinate systems are to be
understood.
14Compare: does the standard model, as opposed to some hoped for unification, explain the electron/muon
mass ratio?
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And as we have seen, Barbour and Bertotti’s relationalist dynamics, and the substantivalist
interpretation of standard Newtonian dynamics, offer us two clear rival alternatives.15
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